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STATEMENT OF CASE 
The Respondent concurs in the statement of the case as 
set forth by the Appellant. 
DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT 
Respondent concurs in the statement of the disposition 
of the case as set forth by Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The above case was presented to the Court upon stipulated 
facts as set forth by the Appellant with which the Respondent 
basically agrees with certain notable exceptions which are 
set forth below: 
The title to the "Slaugh House" was at all times, since 
its purchase in 1967 in the name of her former husband, 
Woodey B. Searle, (Civil 5790, T.R. 243, lines 15-20). The 
rents and profits from the "Slaugh House" were deposited in 
the Searle Cattle Company, a company owned wholley by Woodey 
B. Searle's bank account (deposition of Woodey B. Searle, 
page 21). There have never been prepared any Articles of 
Partnership of the Diamond Hills Hotel nor any Articles of 
Partnership of Searle Brothers (deposition of Woodey B. 
Searle, page 16). No inventory has ever been made of the 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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particular assets of either partnership; only accounts have 
been kept where all rents, etc., were comingled and lumped 
together. Nothing was broken down (deposition of Woodey B. 
Searle, page 18). 
Woodey B. Searle, the father of the plaintiffs Rance, 
Rhett, and Randy Searle, and the defendant in the divorce 
action, has at all times been the agent of the plaintiffs, 
Rance Searle, Rhett Searle, and Randy Searle and as such he 
received the sum of $500 per year. He is still acting in 
that capacity (deposition of Woodey B. Searle, page 4-5; 
also deposition of Randy Searle, page 12; also deposition of 
Rhett Searle, page 3). 
The Fourth Judicial District Court by order of the 
Honorable Ju~ge George E. Ballif, after a full hearing and a 
presentation of evidences, ruled that the "Slaugh House" was 
property belonging to Woodey B. Searle along. Following 
motions to amend and motions for new trial, Judge Ballif 
reaffirmed his original order which awarded the "Slaugh 
House" to Edlean Searle, the former wife of Woodey B. Searle 
and the defendant in this case. See: "Amended Decree of 
Divorce and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law," Civil 
5790. Noteworthy is the statement of Judge Ballif in his 
ruling, as late October 1974, denying a motion for further 
-2-
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proceedings re the "Slaugh House" because the title to it 
had been fully legated previously. 
ARGill1ENT 
The lower Court did not err in holding that the Decree 
of Divorce in Civil No. 5790 was binding upon the Appellants. 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE TITLE TO THE 
SLAUGH HOUSE HAD BEEN PROPERLY DETERMINED IN CIVIL NO. 5790. 
As indicated, the lower Court, after considering the 
matter determined that the title to the "Slaugh House" had 
been fully litigated in Civil No. 5790 (Searle vs. Searle). 
This case was the divorce case and was the subject of long 
and extended inquiry by the Court. The Court there determined 
that the "title to the Slaugh House" was in the father of 
the plaintiffs, Woodey B. Searle, (see amended Decree of 
Divorce and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Searle 
vs. Searle, Civil No. 5790, Uintah County, State of Utah). 
The Honorable Judge George E. Ballif awarded the said "Slaugh 
House to the wife in the divorce action, Edlean Searle, she 
now is the defendant in this action. Subsequently, motions 
were made by Woodey B. Searle to have the Court reconsider 
the title to the "Slaugh House" and the Court in its ruling 
-3-
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dated October 10, 1974 reaffirmed its original position set 
forth in the Amended Decree, dated May 17, 1973 and denied 
the motion stating that the matter had been fully litigated. 
Civil No. 5790 (Searle vs. Searle) was appealed to the Utah 
State Supreme Court where the decision of the trial court 
was affirmed unanimously, Edlean Searle, plaintiff and 
respondent, vs. Woodey B. Searle, defendant and appellant, 
522 P2d 697. 
Thus insofar as either Woodey or his former wife Edlean 
were concerned the question of the title to the "Slaugh 
House" was fully decided and regardless of how the Court 
would have ruled, they or either of them would have been 
bound. 
Respondent contends that no title ever was in the names 
of the plaintiffs in this suit. The scant record availabl~ 
shows that since its purchase in 1967 there never was title 
to the "Slaugh House" was never in the name of anyone except 
Woodey B. Searle, till the Court by its decree awarded it to 
the Defendant in this suit. She immediately possessed the 
premises and improved them and treated them as her own. 
Respondent submits that unless the Court can, from the facts 
presented, find that ownership was in someone other than 
Woodey B. Searle at the time of the divorce _decree the order 
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of the divorce decree must stand. It is admitted that the 
plaintiffs are nowhere to be found in the chain of title to 
the "Slaugh House", nor is there anything extant to so 
indicate by way of memorandum or document their ownership. 
The only thing availabl~ is account records which are in-
conclusive, incomplete and are comingled with other properties 
(deposition of Woodey B. Searle, page 18). 
We are asked to believe that by some strange manner 
title to the "Slaugh House" or a part of it got into the 
names of the plaintiffs in this case, merely by virtue of a 
check that was apparently issued to pay for it. This is 
absurd, when Woodey B. Searle in his deposition states that 
the Searle Cattle Company, and other accounts, were not 
broken down and especially when rents from the "Slaugh 
House" were paid to the Searle Cattle Company which he alone 
owned, (deposition of Woodey B. Searle, pages 18 & 21). 
The Court below based upon the facts presented to it 
found that the title to the property (Slaugh House) had baen 
fully litigated in the divorce action. 
Respondent further submits that the decision of the 
lower Court, was based upon the facts before it should be 
sustaining by the appellate Court. 
-5-
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POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE APPELLANTS 
PLAINTIFFS WERE COLLATERALLY ESTOPPED BY REASON OF RES 
JUDICATA IN THE DIVORCE CASE IN SEARLE VS. SEARLE FROM 
CLAIMING TITLE TO THE SLAUGH HOUSE. 
Appellants argue that they should not be bound by ~he 
l~we~ Court~ order since they were not parties to it --
though it is readily admitted that they were all of the age 
of majority at the time of the divorce action; that they 
were partners with Woodey B. Searle and that Woodey B. 
Searle was their agent (manager). They further contend th~t 
the rule of mutuality and privity were not present and that 
would foreclose their right to be heard -- though they admit 
that the res of the law suit (title to the Slaugh House) was 
decided by the previous Court. All of the pleadings, 
motions, admissions, etc., and the inferences to be derived 
therefrom must be considered by the lower Court (Fredrick 
May and Company vs. Dunn, 13 Utah 2nd 40, 368 P2d 266) 
not just the complaint as stated by the Appellant. It is 
submitted that the decision of the lower Court in this 
action was based upon all of the information before it in 
this matter. Thus, the appellate Court is faced with the 
question, did the? lower Court have information and facts 
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sufficient before it to find that the issue raised (title to 
the Slaugh House) was litigated and that res judicata forbids 
a relitigation of the title, and are the plaintiffs estopped 
from pursuing this actions? Respondent submits the answer 
is in the affirmative. 
The general rule relative to res judicata and estoppel 
is stated, as follows: 
In determining the plea of res judicata, three questions 
are pertinent: Was the issue decided in the prior 
judication identical with the one presented in the 
action in question? Was there a final judgment on its 
merits? Was the party against whom the plea is asserted 
a party or in privity wjth a party to the prior adjudication? 
(Bernhard vs Bank of America, 122 P2d 892) 
This is the better reasoned rule and the foregoing case 
has become the generally accepted statement of the law in 
the majority of jurisdiction in the United States. 
In the instant case, applying the question of the 
Bernhard case, the answers are all in the affirmative. 
Civil No. 5790, (Searle vs. Searle) decided the title to the 
"Slaugh House" which is raised by this case; the judgment in 
Civil No. 5790, (Searle vs. Searle) was final and was a 
judgment on its merits; and again the parties to the action, 
the plaintiffs, were and are still in privity with the 
defendant, their father, in the prior action, Civil No. 
5790, (Searle vs. Searle). 
-7-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Woodey B. Searle was and continued to be the agent of 
the plaintiffs at all times before and after the initiation 
of the present litigation, in fact he managed all their 
affairs (see depositions of Woodey B. Searle, pages 4-5; 
deposition of Randy Searle, page 12; and deposition of Rhett 
Searle, page 3). 
Speaking of privity and mutuality, there are some cases 
explaining these principals and why privities are bound; 
these are where the parties sought to be bound by the judgment 
are principal and agent, master and servant, indernnitor and 
indemnitee, and lessor and lessee. (See, Taylor vs. Barker, 
70 Utah 534 262 2P 266) Thus, in the instant case the 
agency being established between Woodey B. Searle and his 
sons, the plaintiffs, this agency precludes the relitigation 
of the title to the "Slaugh House" in a subsequent action. 
(See Tietelbaum Furs Inc. vs. Dominican Insurance Co. 
375 P2d 439)' where a decision in a criminal case was held 
res judicata the right to legitate a question decided in the 
criminal case. (See also, Paulos vs. Janetakos, Ex of 
Estate of 142 ALR 1237, and subsequent annotations of same 
volume.) 
The Court is directed to weight of authority which 
permits the use of the doctrine of collateral estoppel and 
-8-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
more over holding the rule of mutuality inoperative and deed 
letter (see DeWitt vs. Hall 1967 NY case 19 NY 2d 141, 225 
NE 2d 195, 31 ALR 3rd 1035). 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT RULED CORRECTLY THAT THE PLAINTIFFS WERE 
ESTOPPED FROM LITIGATING THE TITLE OF THE SLAUGH HOUSE. 
In addition to the doctrine of collateral estoppel or 
judgment by estoppel which invokes the doctrine of res 
judicata above mentioned, the plaintiffs are and should be 
debarred from asserting any claim to the property (Slaugh 
House) awarded to the defendant in the prior divorce action. 
The rule is well established that one who stands by and sees 
another expend money or land under a belief that he has the 
right or title thereto will not be permitted setup or assert 
his claim to said land, or as otherwise stated, "If a person 
maintains silence when he ought to speak equity will debar 
him from speaking when conscience requires him to be silent." 
(See, Allen vs. Cameron 8 Utah 8; Murphy vs. Humphrey 23 
Utah 633; Tanner vs. Provo Reservoir Company, et. al 99 
Utah 158 103 P2d 234; Saylor vs. Kentucky Cardinal Coal 
Corp. 205 Ky 724 266 S.W. 388, 50 ALR 666 with annotations 
50 ALR 668 to 973.) 
In the present case all of the plaintiffs were of the 
age of majority at the time of the divorce action. They had 
-9-
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every reason to know the status of the Court decree entered 
by Judge Ballif. They were partners with their father 
Woodey B. Searle. They emphasized that their father, agent 
and manager, at all times considered them and discussed with 
them the status of their property, (see deposition of Randy 
Searle, Page 12-13; deposition of Rhett, page 3). Now to 
permit these plaintiffs to, claim the property from their 
mother, the defendant, who has improved it, possessed it, 
and rented and used it for years, would be an unconscionable 
wrong. By their silence the plaintiffs are now estopped 
from asserting any claim to the "Slaugh House." 
Their silence has been pronounced from 1974 till the commence-
ment of this action. 
As pointed out above, the failure of the plaintiffs to 
disaffirm the transfer of the "Slaugh House" to defendant, 
their mother, constituted ratification of what was done. 
Note, the Supreme Court stated in Zeese vs. Estate of 
Siegel 534 P2d 85, as follows: 
"Ratification relates back to the time when the un-
authorized act was done; and although the act may have 
[been] without any precedent authority, ratification 
creates the relation of principal and agent." 
Thus, the plaintiffs had a duty to disaffinn their 
father's statement, under oath, that the "Slaugh House" was 
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his, if indeed it wasn't, at the time of the statement or at 
least at the time the divorce was granted. 
Again, ~ote the statements of the Utah Supreme Court 
quoting from Williston Contract in Moses vs. Archie McFarland 
& Sons 230 P2d 571 at page 573: 
"Even silence with full knowledge of the facts may 
manifest affirmance and thus operate as ratification." 
Also from the Utah case of Lowe vs. April Induscries, 
Inc. 531 P2d 1297: 
"Ratification is expressed or implied. Implied where 
it arises under circumstances of acquiescence or where a 
duty to disaffirm is not promptly exercised." 
POINT IV 
THE LOWER COURT RULED CORRECTLY BECAUSE A PARTNERSHIP IS 
LIABLE TO A THIRD PERSON FOR REPRESENTATIONS OR ACTS OF 
ANOTHER PARTNER. 
The statutes of the State of Utah provide as follows: 
§48-1-8, Partnership bound by admission of partner 
An admission or representation made by any partner 
concerning partnership affairs within the scope of his 
authority as conferred by this chapter is evidence 
against ~he partnership. 
§48-1-10, Partnership bound by partners wrongful act 
Whereby any wrongful act or omission of any partner 
acting in the ordinary course of business of the 
partnership or with the authority of his copa7tners 
loss or injury is cused to any person, not being a 
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partner in the partnership, or any penalty is incurred, 
the partnership is liable therefore to the same extent 
as the partner so ailing or omitting to act. 
§48-1-12, Nature of partnership liability all partners 
are liable: 
(1) Jointly and severally for everything charge-
able to the partnership under Sections 48-1-10 and 
48-1-11. ... 
In the present case there is no dispute as to the 
existence of a partnership between the Searle boys, Rance, 
Rhett and Randy and their father, Woodey B. Sea::: le: the boys 
together owning fifty per cent and the father owning fifty 
per cent. The defendant Diamond Hills Motel was likewise a 
partnership owned in the same proportion. Woodey B. Searle 
was the general manager for the boys and he conducted the 
affairs of the partnerships, as such he enjoyed and exercised 
almost unlimited authority to deal and do as he chose relative 
to the partnership assets. He received remuneration for his 
services and by virtue of his being manager, was clothed 
with more authroity than is the case in usual agency relations!; 
The general rule is stated that the powers of an agent are 
particularly broad in the case of one acting as a general 
agent or manager; such a position presupposses a degree of 
confidence reposed and investiture with liberal powers for 
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the exercise of judgment and discretion. (See, Ackerman vs. 
Jennings 140 A 760, 56 ALR 1127, Restatement Agency (2d ed) 
§73, Scholz vs. Lever 7 Wash 2d 76, 109 P2d 294; Monarch 
Lumber vs. Wallace 132 Montana 163 314 P2d 884) 
Woodey B. Searle testified in the divorce trial that he 
owned the "Slaugh House" (transcript in Civil No. 5790). He 
stated on inquiry as to whose name it was in. "It is in my 
name solely." Such a statement made by Woodey was either 
the truth or it was a falsehood being perpetrated upon the 
partnerships of which he was a fifty per cent owner. If he 
did falsely testify, then he, because of his broad power as 
manager and general agent of the partnerships bound the 
partnership by his representation. Thus, the defendant in 
the present case may not be challenged in her ownership of 
the "Slaugh House" by the principals to the partnership. 
The partnership is bound by the admission of the managing 
partner §48-1-8 UCA. For arguments sake, the partnership is 
bound by the wrongful act of the managing partner represent-
ing his sole ownership in the "Slaugh House" and by the 
managers failure or omission to set the record straight, 
§48-1-10 UCA. The partnership is bound by the breach of 
trust of the managing partner wherein the third party 
(Edlean Searle, the defendant) received the property as part 
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of her distributive share in the divorce, §48-1-11. This 
because Woodey B. Searle knowingly did testify in the 
divorce case about property which he now alleges is partnersh 
property. It was certainly within his authority and res-
ponsibility to tell the truth about the partnership. The 
partnership should stand the loss rather than a third party 
such as the defendant, plaintiffs mother. 
Further, it is an obligation on a partnership and 
particularly upon the managing partner to render full and 
complete accounts of the partnership. Discovery by way of 
disposition indicates that the only accounting was a cursory 
account of income which was comingled by the manager with 
his own separate companies, all was lumped together (see 
deposition of Woodey B. Searle, page 18). Under the general 
partnership, statute of Utah, Title 48, Chapter 1, there is 
an obligation, as above-mentioned, to inventory the assets 
for the benefit of the partnership, this has not been done 
which further detracts from any creditability the partnerships 
may have. It would indeed appear that these were merely 
entities of convenience and had no real basis in fact since 
the assets, profits, rents, etc. could move apparently with 
rapidity from one to another at the convenience of the 
parties, particularly the manager. 
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POINT V 
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT 
NEVER RELINQUISHED HER STATUTORY INTEREST IN THE SLAUGH 
HOUSE. 
As mentioned above, the defendant received from Woodey 
B. Searle certain real property part of which was the 
"Slaugl1 Ho11_se." No·.., plaintiffs and their father claim an 
interest in the "Slaugh House" asserting it was partnership 
property. It is admitted that title was solely in the name 
of Woodey B. Searle and that he held title to it in that 
capacity during his marriage to Edlean, the defendant, and 
further it is admitted that she at no time ever made a 
relinquishment of her distributive share to which she is 
entitled under the provisions of §74-4-3 UCA 1953. In fact 
the Court in its decision in Civil No. 5790 decreed certain 
lands part of which was the "Slaugh House"; these lands are 
at least properly part of the property she would be entitled 
to receive under §74-4-3 UCA and had Woodey died prior to 
the divorce, her claim to the one-third of the real estate 
to which she had made no relinquishment would have become 
hers (see In Re Oslters Estate 286 P2d 796). 
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POINT VI 
THE PLAINTIFFS ARE BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATION FROM 
CLAIMING TITLE TO THE SLAUGH HOUSE. 
Utah Code Annotated §78-12-5 provides: 
No actions shall for the recovery of real property 
or for the possession thereof shall be maintained, 
unless it appears that the plaintiff, his ancestor, 
granter or predecessor was seized or possessed of the 
property in question within seven years before the 
cormnencement of the action. 
The plaintiffs cannot claim any ownership to the 
"Slaugh House" since they never at anytime had any ownership 
therein nor in the chain of title. The present defendant 
ties her title, through the court order to her former 
husband, Woodey B. Searle, who took title in 1967 well over 
seven years ago. Plaintiffs cannot claim through their 
father, since the court order acted as a conveyance vesting 
title in defendant Edlean Searle. Also, there is no an-
cestoral relationship claimable till the ancestor dies and 
the claimants can claim as his heirs, (see Bailey vs. Bailey 
25 Mich 185; McCarthy vs. Marsh 5 NY 275; Springer vs. 
Fortune 2 H-"nd" (Ohio) 52; Wheatcrafc vs. Hall 106 Ofiio St 
21, D8 NE 368). 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondents assert that the decision of the lower Court 
should be sustained and it should stand because of the 
following: 
(1) The facts before the Court sustain its judgment 
and the appellants tribunal should not disturbe the decision 
based upon facts. 
(2) Arguendo if there is any basis, though not admitted 
by respondent, the plaintiffs are debarred from resisting 
the ruling of the lower Court holding that Civil No. 5790 is 
res judicata to the present case because of collateral 
estoppel. 
(3) The principals of equity forbid and further estop 
the plaintiffs from challenging the decision when they 
failed to timely raise any objection to the divorce courts 
ruling. 
(4) The statutes and rules of partnership hold the 
plaintiffs who are partners liable to third parties who 
might have been injured, in this case their mother. 
(5) The defendant here received the property in 
question and she has made no relinquishment of her statutory 
share. 
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(6) And that plaintiffs are barred by the statute of 
limitations from claiming the "Slaugh House." 
(7) And, an over the shoulder observation, not supported 
by authority on the part of defendant, is that this case has 
been brought and instigated on the part of a disappointed 
former spouse who knowing that there was no further avenue 
open in the divorce case has sought to retrieve some of his 
lost property. 
The order dismissing the complaint with prejudice 
should be sustained and affirmed. 
submitted, 
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